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ABSTRACT

A review of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act's (CETA's) results, strengths, and weaknesses, and future role in light of expected economic and technological changes indicates that it is time to strengthen--though not necessarily enlarge--America's only available second-chance training system. Cost-benefit analysis of the major CETA components (the job training, job corps, classroom training, public service employment, work experience, and summer youth employment) indicates that they are a good investment for society. In addition, such CETA components as nonoccupational training, youth school retention and work transition programs, and smaller pilot projects also seem to be cost effective. While both CETA's service components and delivery system have some serious weaknesses, a number of options are available to remedy them. Current and anticipated international competition, technological changes, and economic problems in certain regions of the U.S. and such new labor force entrants as additional refugees, people delaying retirement, and displaced homemakers reinforce the need for a program to retrain workers and/or upgrade their skills. (MN)

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CETA'S RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

A Policy Statement by
The National Council on Employment Policy

2000 K Street, N.W., Suite 454
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September 1981

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The National Council on Employment Policy is a private nonprofit organization of academicians and policy experts with a special interest and expertise in the area of employment and training. This policy statement represents the combined judgment of the Council members. Despite divergence of opinion on details, the members agreed to a unanimous statement.

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CETA'S RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) faces expiration September 30, 1982. In anticipation of the required reconsideration, it is timely to begin a review of the CETA experience since 1974, as well as the relevant experience of employment and training programs that preceded CETA. The critical issues are (1) what have been CETA's results?, (2) what have been its problems?, and (3) what are the implications for continuation and modification?

CETA is both a package of alternative employment and training services and a system for the delivery of those services. Both must be examined in pursuit of answers to the three queries.

The Results

The ultimate goal of CETA's employment and training services is to improve the employment and earnings of an economically disadvantaged clientele (Table 1). For most of those services, results can be measured by the earnings and employment gains of participants compared to those of similar nonprogram participants. Some services have other objectives or results not directly and measurably related to employment and earnings. For those, other measures of results must be derived.

Evaluative data are limited but consistent in their findings. From the sources described in the methodological appendix, the evidence (Table II) indicates that almost all of the major CETA components were a good investment for society.

- o Every dollar invested in on-the-job (OJT) training returned \$2.28 in social benefits.

- o A dollar spent on Job Corps returned about \$1.39 to society.

- o Every dollar spent on classroom training returned \$1.14 to society.

- o Participants in public service employment in 1976 earned roughly \$290 more than the comparison group individuals in 1977 and 1978.

- o Enrollees in work experience unadorned by other training activities had, on the average, no higher or lower post-participation gains than their comparison groups.

Cost-benefit analysis and other statistical evaluation methods are, of course, not an exact science. But the direction of these findings is consistent with a wide range of assumptions. The present value of returns to the taxpayers tended to be less than costs primarily because stipends and wages constituted a neutral transfer payment to society but were a budgetary cost to the taxpayer. This fact may help explain why taxpayers appear restive about what appears to be a productive social investment.

Table I
CETA Component Enrollments and Costs
(1980)

Component	Enrollment	Cost per service year	Cost per participant
On-the-job training	181,000	\$ 6,088	\$2,080
Job Corps	95,000	13,193	5,827
Classroom training	750,000	8,046	3,554
Public service employment	870,000	9,030	3,702
Work experience	400,000	5,311	1,641
Summer youth employment	705,000	N.A.	N.A.
Other youth programs	330,000	N.A.	N.A.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Table II
CETA Component Outcomes

Component	Earnings increase over comparison groups (1976 enrollees) ^a			Benefit-cost ratio ^a	
	1977	1978	percent change in 1977 over comparison groups	social	taxpayer
On-the-job training	\$839	\$574	18	2.28	.72
Job Corps	209 ^b	487 ^b	8	1.39	.91
Classroom training	347	442	10	1.14	.60
Public service employment	261	326	7	NA ^c	NA ^c
Work experience	-147	-187	-4	.50	.50

^aFor the data sources, assumptions used, and a discussion of the methodology, see appendix.

^bJob Corps data for 1978-79 follow-up of 1977 enrollees.

^cNot calculable because of uncertainties of value of work accomplished.

The CETA components for which earnings increases are not directly measurable and benefit-cost ratios are not calculable fit into three categories: (1) nonoccupational training, (2) youth school retention and work transition programs, and (3) pilot projects not large enough to be generalizable. But even for these, indicators of success or failure can be derived.

o The Summer Youth Employment Program reduced arrest rates from 3.2 percent to 1.5 percent and failure to return to school from 9.4 to 6.1 percent.

o The Youth Incentive Entitlement Program, which provided guaranteed employment in return for a pledge to return to, or stay in, school, raised retention rates from 76 percent to 80 percent and increased the rate of return to school by dropouts from 22 percent to 36 percent.

o The Supported Work program improved the employment and earnings experience of AFDC recipients and ex-offenders but not youth and addicts.

o Participation in 12 week adult basic education programs in specific instances raised reading and math skills one to 1.5 years, and attainment of general education development (GED) certificates improved placement chances by 8 percent and earnings by 13 percent.

o English as a second language was effective at opening the labor market to refugees and other immigrants at low cost.

o Job search training programs at costs ranging from \$200 to \$1,000 per participant improved job finding success by 25 to 50 percent.

o The Career Intern program which raised high school completion rates by 50 percent and employment probabilities by one-third may be representative of alternative school programs funded by CETA.

Strengths and Weaknesses

CETA's problems must be divided between those that relate to its service components and those that emerge from the delivery system.

Service Components

The major focus of CETA system has been on the build up, management, and precipitous dismantling of a major public service employment program. As a result, in most cases, there has been little attention given to innovation in training models. Even though the results remain positive, one would have hoped for significant improvements under local stewardship. Yet some of the old problems remain, and new ones have emerged.

1. CETA has not generated new training institutions. Instead, it has utilized skill centers established in the 1960s and some mainstream vocational and proprietary schools. While the latter may offer quality training, they often lack the experience, rapport, and supportive services

to deal with a disadvantaged population. The CETA eligible population must be screened for them. Specialized skill centers were created under the Manpower Development and Training Administration in the 1960s to serve that population, and many still exist. Their staffs are dedicated, but their facilities and equipment often have been allowed to deteriorate. There is increased use of community-based organizations as training organizations. They tend to do well in remedial education and English as a second language, but, with some notable exceptions, lack the experience and facilities for quality occupational training.

2. Just as in the period before CETA, there are far more eligible individuals than there are funds to serve them. The federal pressure is to keep per participant costs low and to insure immediate placement. These objectives are accomplished by stressing short-term training averaging less than half a year for high turnover occupations for which a disadvantaged person can be prepared at the entry level in a short time. But longer training pays off although not necessarily in immediate placement rates. Long term follow-up data demonstrate a positive relationship between training duration and future earnings. For instance, those trained for between 11 and 20 weeks earned an average of \$269 more per year than comparison groups in the two years following participation; those with 20 to 40 weeks of training earned \$724 more; and those few trained beyond 40 weeks gained \$1,487 per year.

3. Some people seem to enroll in CETA programs in order to receive the training allowance. In fiscal 1980, 30 percent of the funds expended for CETA's Title IIBC training programs were used for allowances. Even 14 and 15 year olds receive the minimum wage for their hours of participation. As a result, some participants receive higher take-home pay during training than before and after placement. While few would begrudge this in-program income, there is concern for the distorted incentive affects and for applicants who are not admitted to training because funds are inadequate. Training programs should place less emphasis on income support and more on actual training. The evidence indicates that few people would be unable to enter these programs if a reasonable shift in funds was made in the direction of a higher percentage going to actual training and less to allowances.

4. On-the-job training remains the highest payoff component, yet less than 10 percent of CETA participants are enrolled in it. Employers are reluctant to participate for a subsidy of 50 percent of wages for an average of 4.1 months of training. If they can be persuaded to participate, they tend to insist on very restrictive screening.

5. Job Corps is a honed and refined system which has learned and profited from past criticism. It is centrally funded by an experienced staff but decentrally operated by private and public contractors. It has a common curriculum and staff development program and a feedback system that allows each center to learn from the experience of all others. It also has had the funding to invest in computer-assisted and computer-managed instruction and other training innovations. It deals with the most disadvantaged of youth, but its residential setting makes it possible to confront their personal as well as occupational needs. Mobility, which exposes youth to other labor markets, also is important. The Job Corps'

most serious weaknesses are its inability to retain more than one-third of the enrollees and the lack of placement assistance.

6. Work experience, in most settings, provides income and involvement in rudimentary work activities but seems to do nothing to increase employability. However, a few prime sponsors have imaginatively linked work experience with classroom and on-the-job training with impressive results. Also work experience for in-school youth is a proven approach to increase school retention and reduce crime, even if there are no positive employment and income results.

7. Public service employment, as practiced prior to the 1978 CETA amendments, seems to have served in part as on-the-job training in the public sector. PSE participants who went on to regular jobs in public agencies accounted for most of the estimated earnings gains. However, the 1978 amendments focused PSE on a more disadvantaged population and fostered a work crew approach which is more like work experience than like OJT. No information is currently available to determine whether or not earlier income gains have persisted along with the other benefits produced by this targeted approach.

8. Remedial basic education and English as a second language (ESL) are essential to those who lack them, but they meet the full needs of only those who are otherwise employable. Therefore, except in areas with a large number of immigrants with substantial previous work experience, remedial education and ESL are more appropriately perceived as supportive components to occupational skill training.

9. Job search training, on the other hand, appears to be useful in the short run to job seekers at every level of the labor market. What is lacking is knowledge of whether these investments pay off over the long run. How much of these job seeking skills are retained by CETA clients over the course of time?

10. There are a variety of alternative schools and school-to-work transition services which appear promising but need further refinement and experience before wholesale adoption.

11. For all CETA components, the more highly disadvantaged, in general, make the greatest gains. These gains tend to be achieved, not from higher wages than those of comparison groups, but from increased labor force participation and more stable employment. These programs probably provide a new access route into the labor market, but little training is provided for more than entry level jobs. Given the economic and demographic realities of the 1960s and 1970s, there may have been some justification for this. But in the 1980s, access beyond the entry level will be increasingly required to help both CETA clients and employers who will face a different set of demographic and economic forces.

The Delivery System

Experience seems to support the general decentralized and decategorized approach that underlies the CETA delivery system. However, a number of weaknesses deserve attention.

1. Few of the federal staff at the national and regional level have had experience at the front line of a prime sponsor operation. The two sets of staff do not have the common experience and language to allow them to communicate and understand each other's problems. Since the federal staff are not generally capable of providing technical assistance to improve the output of CETA services, they tend to emphasize enforcement of procedures to the exclusion of substantive concerns. There should be greater exchange of personnel at the various levels to build that body of common experience and rapport.

2. A major positive development of CETA training is the increased use of mainstream training facilities. This reduces the segregation of CETA-eligible clients by not isolating them in specially designed institutions.

3. CETA promotes, in theory, labor market planning. Yet the existing incentives are inadequate to encourage units of government to combine in meaningful labor market-wide consortia. The balance of states also have no labor market meaning. Planning is to be forward looking and continuous. Yet the data provided for planning purposes, especially knowledge of future funding levels, is always late and sometimes long after the fact. Prime sponsors are hindered by constant changes in regulations, program structures and funding levels. The planning concept will not be meaningful until there is multi-year funding and stability in federal policies.

4. The inputs of all relevant interests in the community--target groups, employers, labor organizations and service deliverers--are essential to decentralized decisionmaking. However, Congress has now mandated three sets of advisory councils for each prime sponsor, all with overlapping and unclear functions. One should be enough.

5. Efforts have been made to increase private sector remedial employment and training programs. However, the results have been very mixed, and CETA private industry councils have not demonstrated a better track record compared to prime sponsors in the marketing of OJT. Yet private sector efforts should be continued and encouraged.

6. The people in the middle in the CETA system have come to be the regional office staff. At present, they have few meaningful functions and little authority. As such, they are often, at no fault of their own, impediments in the communications process. They should have a meaningful role and authority to carry it out or be removed from the scene.

7. There has been a continuous but unsuccessful search for designing performance measurements. The immediate placement and positive termination rate standards are misleading and counterproductive. They favor short duration training and work experience because they produce low-cost immediate payoffs, although longer term follow-up data prove that long duration training and on-the-job training have much higher ratios of benefits over costs.

Reporting systems require data which are of little value to the federal agency and provide no useful feedback to the states and localities. Yet Job Corps demonstrates the potential for using modern data processing

equipment for a uniform system in which both individual participant data and management information can be entered to be recalled at all levels for meaningful analysis. It merits examination to determine the feasibility of replication on a broader scale.

8. No useful system of technical assistance and staff development has emerged. At this point, the expertise is in the skills of the most alert of the prime sponsor staff around the country. Initial experiments are underway with prime-to-prime technical assistance, and this should be encouraged. To have a substantial impact, such technical assistance and staff development aid must be made available in the local communities.

Increasing the Payoff

Two decades ago, the nation made a commitment to upgrade and give a second chance to those members of its work force who were experiencing labor market hardship. In many cases labor market pathologies resulted because the nation's primary "first chance" institutions were failing certain types of individuals. A "second chance" system was required to deal with remedial employment and training problems.

In recent years media coverage of CETA has centered on fraud and abuse. Any undertaking involving billions of dollars and millions of individuals is likely to be marred by graft and corruption. Strong efforts must be made to rout out any corruption, but CETA has not experienced a uniquely higher level compared to other multibillion dollar undertakings. In the meantime, it is clear that, despite limitations and administrative problems, most of CETA's service components have been moderately successful with benefits well in excess of costs. A number of options are available to increase that payoff.

1. Emphasis should turn from employment to training within CETA's range of service alternatives with opportunities in both classroom and on-the-job training. The need for job creation programs should, however, not be neglected. In some labor markets, the existence of substantial surplus labor may mean that job creation is the most realistic use of public funds and of the participants' time.

2. Given the diversity of the CETA-eligible population, a two-tiered classroom training system appears desirable. Remedial and entry level training for all would be available, while a second level of career training should be provided for those who are able to profit from more advanced training. The remedial/entry training could occur in a specialized institution such as a skill center that provides all the necessary supportive services. The career training should occur in the mainstream institutions in those communities in which they enjoy a positive image in the minds of employers, the student body and the public. Training should also involve the workplace whenever possible.

3. The training allowance system should be adjusted to provide a subsistence component (based on family income and need) and an incentive component (to encourage performance, completion and placement). But income

support should be used sparingly to maximize resources allocated for actual training.

4. OJT rules should be liberalized to improve access to the private sector. A short "try-out" period (perhaps 3 months) before hiring, with a minimum transition requirement, and with subsequent on-the-job training subsidies where demonstrably needed, probably would increase the effectiveness and marketability of OJT. However, as indicated by the initial efforts of even the private industry councils, OJT can be expected to provide slots for only a fraction of individuals in the CETA pool, particularly when jobs in the private sector are expanding slowly.

5. The Job Corps has become successful and effective for the one-third of the participants who complete the program. It is a model of comprehensive treatment, providing a complete spectrum of opportunities ranging from special learning aid for the disabled all the way to college options for corpsmembers. Computer-assisted and computer-managed instruction is individualized and self-paced with achievements recorded and rewarded. However, it is mainly residential and "the 24-hour-a-day" treatment effect cannot be overlooked. The approach of competitive contracting with the private sector might be extended to more parts of the CETA system. Also, the utilization of programmed learning devices and curriculum materials, which have proved to be successful, should be expanded beyond the Job Corps.

6. A variant of PSE should be introduced which would permit a try-out for unsubsidized jobs in the public and nonprofit sectors, parallel to OJT in the private sector. There should be the same possibilities for OJT subsidization after the try-out but also with the same transitional requirements.

7. Work experience should be coupled with remedial education and occupational training as part of a sequence of services for youth and particularly disadvantaged adult subgroups.

8. Job search assistance appears to be an effective mechanism, at least in the short run, for helping individuals who are already seeking work--rather than as a tool to motivate persons to find employment. If it were utilized as a final component of other program activities, it would probably increase placement rates. Current budgetary obstacles to its provision through the public employment service also should be eliminated.

9. Remedial basic education and English as a second language are low cost, productive programs and essential for those who lack them.

10. Emphasis should be placed on sequential meshing of different services so that an individual can be helped on several fronts. Basic education, for example, could be interfaced with occupational skill training which would lead to OJT or job search instruction. While this will raise costs, it is a worthwhile investment.

11. A more extensive interchange of federal, state, and local personnel should become a regular part of the CETA program to create a common experience base for communication and understanding. Training expertise should be incorporated into both prime sponsor and federal staff.

12. An effective national system of technical assistance and curriculum and staff development should be introduced, drawing on prime sponsor strengths, as well as on private and public education sources. National workshops are helpful but such assistance must be brought to the local level on a periodic basis as well.

13. Congress should provide multi-year funding to CETA prime sponsors and restrain itself from too frequent innovations in the system.

The Future

In many ways, demographic and economic developments are recreating the issues out of which MDTA emerged in 1962. When the federal government initially funded employment and training programs, a war on poverty was not yet declared and the disadvantaged had not been discovered. Technological displacement and Appalachian plant closings at first were the major motivators for the legislation that was directed toward "retraining." All of today's robots and computers were on the horizon at a lower level of sophistication and at higher relative costs. But the entry of the baby boom generation, and millions of women (including wives and mothers) into the labor force depressed the relative wage structure compared to the cost of capital goods and encouraged more labor intensive production processes. Slow growth and excess capacity also reduced the drive toward major capital investments.

Now international competition and economic problems in certain regions of the U.S. renew the plant closing and relocation threat. All the signs are for continued influx of refugees and other immigrants. Geographical barriers will become more, not less, serious for central city residents, even as their numbers decline. The shrinking numbers of new youth entrants to the labor force will require more, not less, training. Delayed retirement may involve second careers and retraining rather than continuation of the old jobs. The displaced homemaker has not disappeared from the scene. Job creation in both the public and private sectors will remain necessary in central cities and depressed areas. Periodically rising national unemployment will refocus attention from time to time on the public service employment issue.

As recent events in the armed forces have demonstrated, intensive capital investments in highly advanced equipment require efforts to build and maintain a well motivated and skilled work force. Deficiencies in the latter types of investments can vastly reduce the benefits of the former. More emphasis will have to be placed on skill upgrading if the workforce is expected to utilize productively the technological advances of anticipated higher capital investment rates.

Given this setting and the proven results of CETA in the training field, it is time to strengthen--though not necessarily enlarge--the only available "second chance" training system we have in America. In a period when we must be concerned about reducing inflation, boosting American productivity, and strict federal budget constraints, it is important to realize that investing in human capital still makes good economic sense.

Appendix

Methodological Considerations

The methodology employed in the social benefit-cost analyses contained in this policy statement considers the costs to society to include all program operating expenses except transfers, plus foregone earnings of the participants. Benefits include the estimated value of useful work performed during enrollment, post-program earnings gains (from higher wages and/or increased hours of paid employment), administrative cost savings from reduced participation in income maintenance programs, and various other social benefits (e.g., in the case of Job Corps these benefits included savings from reduced crime, and drug and health problems).

Future net benefits are discounted at a rate of 15 percent per year to estimate a present value of this stream of gains at the time the program expenditures were made. The discount includes a real rate of interest and an inflation factor. Also, the benefit-cost ratios assume a 14 percent annual decline in the measured gains between the program participants and comparison groups.

The taxpayers' benefit-cost ratio considers all budgeted items, including trainee allowances, as costs. The entire earnings gains and foregone earnings are not included in this ratio because only taxes on earnings gains are benefits to the taxpayers. This ratio also considers the benefits of output produced in the programs and the various estimated savings from reduced crime and transfer payments as well as changes in administrative costs between social programs.

Various assumptions are made regarding the average future worklife for program participants. For the Job Corps the average is assumed to be 43 years, while for classroom training the average is assumed to be 39 years. But given the 14 percent annual decline in assumed measured gains, and the 15 percent discount rate, estimates are not vastly altered if worklife assumptions are somewhat different.

Estimates of Job Corps impacts are based on a two-year follow-up of a sample of 1977 participants and a carefully selected comparison group drawn from eligible youth from areas of limited Job Corps recruiting and further matched by regression analysis. For other CETA components the continuous longitudinal manpower survey (CLMS) data followed for two years a sample of participants who terminated in 1976. The comparison group was drawn from the Current Population Survey, with matched data obtained from Social Security records. The CLMS earnings and employment data for participants was then matched to the comparison group data for net impact estimates.

The procedures for selecting the comparison groups and for measuring post-program earnings are rigorous and generally conservative so as not to exaggerate impacts. For example, all estimates include an assumed annual decline in the differentials between participants and comparison groups, even though the measured differentials for some CETA components (i.e., classroom training and Public Service Employment) grew larger between the first and second year. More years of follow-up will be required before we

know if the participants' benefit time paths move further apart, converge, or remain parallel over time with comparison groups.

There are other technical issues inherent in the ex-post-facto multiple regression matching of participants with nonparticipants and the use of Social Security data to estimate comparison group earnings. Also, longitudinal data take many years to collect and months to analyze. It is reasonable to expect that the gap between the time period covered and release date of the data will be shortened, but the gap--due to the very nature of longitudinal data--will remain significant. Most of the apparent changes since the 1976 CETA cohorts studied could have been expected to have widened the post-enrollment gap between the treatment and comparison groups. For instance, women as a proportion of all enrollees has risen, and women had higher wage gains than men in the years studied. Also, as noted in the text, longer training duration brings higher gains, and training durations have lengthened. On the other hand, it is noted in the text that PSE gains may have fallen.

Yet having made all of these qualifications regarding the data source, the estimation assumptions, the creation of comparison groups, and the time lag, the National Council on Employment Policy believes that the results are important and should not be ignored. Despite these problems, this methodology and data have real advantages over previous attempts, and tentative conclusions and lessons can be drawn from this body of information. Also, the general findings for the various components and individuals served by these programs remain robust under a wide range of assumptions.

Further details and analysis of this methodology are provided by Charles Maller, et al., The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, May 1980); Mathematica Policy Research, Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Job Corps Program, Second Follow Up Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, April 1980); Robert Taggart, A Fisherman's Guide--An Assessment of Training Programs for Persons of Limited Employability, 1981, unpublished; Net Impact Report Number 1--Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: USDOL, June 1981); Westat, Inc., Supplement Number 1 to Net Impact Report Number 1--Impact of 1978 Earnings on New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (unpublished, February 1981); The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980); and Richard P. Nathan, Public Service Employment: A Field Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981).

Given the real world problems of statistical research, the fate of any one program should not rise or fall based on only one experiment. However, the most recent CLMS data on the change in earnings after program participation seem to follow the general findings of previous research of employment and training programs, as indicated by the following survey (Table III):

Table III

The Change in Earnings for the Year After Program Participation

CLASSROOM TRAINING		ON-THE-JOB TRAINING	
Ashenfelter		Kiefer	
Black Males	\$318 to \$470	Black Males	\$(-160)
White Males	139 to 322	White Males	(-61)
Black Females	441 to 552	Black Females	386
White Females	354 to 572	White Females	926
Borus		Prescott and Cooley	
Males	305	Males	796
Borus and Prescott		Sewell	
Males	516	Males	375
Females	36	Females	754
Cooley, McGuire and Prescott		JOB CORPS	
Males	71 to 234	Kiefer	
Females	168 to 291	Black Males	(-179)
Hardin and Borus		White Males	(-74)
	251	Black Females	(-188)
Katron		White Females	(-780)
Minority Females	184	Mallar	
White Females	701	Males	187
Kiefer		Females without Children	565
Black Males	(-742) to (-355)	Females with Children	(-236)
White Males	(-644) to (-375)	YOUTH WORK-EXPERIENCE PROGRAMS	
Black Females	591	Borus, Brennan, and Rosen	
White Females	639	Males	554
Main		Females	74
	409	Kiefer	
Page; Gooding		Black Males	101
	446	White Males	(-1,298)
Prescott and Cooley		Black Females	(-40)
Males	652	White Females	(-419)
Sewell		Somers and Stromsdorfer	
Males	432	Black Males	1,245
Cain and Stromsdorfer		White Males	795
White Males	828	Black Females	1,031
White Females	336	White Females	187
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING		ADULT BASIC EDUCATION	
Cooley, McGuire and Prescott		Brazzie	
Males	(-38) to 59	Males	2,368
Females	30 to 226	Roomkin	
Katron		Males	318
Minority Males	1,984	Females	12
White Males	2,181	ADULT WORK EXPERIENCE	
Minority Females	884	Katron	
White Females	926	Minority Females	367
		White Females	629

SOURCE: Michael Borus, "Assessing the Impact of Training Programs," in Eli Ginzberg, ed., Employing the Unemployed (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 34-35, Citations, pp. 195-197.